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Statement Of The Association Of Administrative Law Judges, Inc.*
Executive Summary
The operation of the nation's Social Security program is in disarray. In the case of
the disability system, which is administered by the Social Security System [SSA] and
disburses billions of dollars in benefits, pressure on the system is driven by the burgeoning
caseload of claimants seeking benefits. Next year, 840 administrative law judges
[hereinafter "ALJs" or "judges"] are expected too receive 500,000 new requests for hearing
on claims already twice denied by the agency, with no new resources to cope with the
increased caseload. The system for claims adjudication is antiquated, inefficient and legally
inconsistent.
Congress has enacted an excellent program which the agency has chosen not to
implement, or has simply undermined. The current crisis arises directly from two factors:
first, the agency's unwillingness to follow the law, and second, mismanagement of the
hearings process. The current structure of the federal benefits system is unnecessarily
multi-layered, cumbersome, and unable to provide proper service to the public. At the
hearing level, judges have no input in terms of management of personnel and other
resources, resulting in frustration of the independent judicial function. Standards for
determining eligibility vary from one adjudicative level to another, and vary geographically
as well, resulting in unequal treatment in what purports to be a nationwide program. The
agency is constantly at odds with the judges who adjudicate appeals from claims it denies,
and tries by various means to control the judges, primarily by control of staff and resources.
We propose that the system of claims adjudication be entirely overhauled. We
submit that the current crisis cannot be remedied unless two events occur: first, that the
agency be required to follow the law at every level of claims adjudication; and second, that
* This statement was prepared by the officers and Board of the Association of Administrative
Law Judges, Inc., and sent to Vice President Al Gore and his Task Force on Reinventing Government:
The National Performance Review on August 27, 1993.
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control of the hearing process be restored to the judges. We therefore make the following
recommendations:
Recommendations To Reform SSA Disability Benefits System
A. Fundamental changes in the adjudicative process
1. Passage of the "Reorganization of the Federal Administrative Judiciary Act"
1 to
accomplish economies of scale, eliminate layers of management, ensure the
independence of adjudicators from improper agency influence, and streamline the
personnel structure by replacing it with an efficient system with a lower supervisor-
to-staff ratio.
2. Increase the number of judges to a level sufficient to meet the current workload
crisis, together with adequate support staff.
3. Require the agency to adhere to the provisions of the 1984 Social Security Disability
Reform Act, in particular those requiring uniform standards of adjudication at all
determination levels. It is the failure of the agency to follow the law at the first two
levels of adjudication [initial and reconsideration at DDS] that puts the system into
inevitable breakdown.
4. Require the agency to discontinue inconsistent policies which impact adversely on
the hearing process.
5. Improve the quality of appellate review of ALJ decisions, to provide for decisions of
precedential value and thus a uniform system of disability law.
B. Fundamental changes in the disability program
6. Fund and require the agency to perform continuing disability reviews to assure that
only those who remain eligible continue to receive benefits.
lNow pending in Congress: S 486 and H.R. 2586.
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7. Require the agency to implement and monitor meaningful substance abuse
rehabilitation programs, as well as representative payee programs.
8. Require vocational rehabilitation in cases where such rehabilitation is likely to result
in a productive work life for a claimant [e.g., for those whose condition is expected
to improve, or who are disabled by vocational factors rather than at "listing" level
severity].
9. Reconcile the provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act with those of the
Social Security Disability Act.
C. Procedural changes in adjudication2
10. Begin constructing the hearing file at the DDS level, and eliminate redundant
documents before hearing.
11. Implement face-to-face interviews at DDS.
12. Eliminate the reconsideration determination.
13. Implement meaningful alternative dispute resolution [ADR] measures pre-hearing
and make better use of the legal talents of staff attorneys.
14. Close the evidence after the ALJ hearing.
15. Streamline the decision writing process by, for example, providing for oral decisions
from the bench; entry of minute orders; or authorizing judges to order claimant's
counsel to prepare a proposed decision in cases where the claim is approved.
2Some of these recommendations have already been proposed by OHA. Only the ADR has
been actively pursued.
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Discussion
A. Current Organization.
The current field organization of the office of Hearings and Appeals [OHA] of the
Social Security Administration [SSA] consists of approximately 840 administrative law
judges [ALJsI who are located in approximately 140 hearing offices throughout the nation.
SSA administrative law judges are delegates of the Secretary of HHS appointed pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act as independent adjudicators. The current head of OHA is
an Associate Commissioner appointed by the Commissioner of SSA. In brief, its current
organizational structure consists of:
Central Office: Office of the Associate Commissioner, and Office of the
Chief Administrative Law Judge
Regional Offices: Ten separate regions throughout the country that
correspond roughly to the eleven federal circuit courts of
appeals. Each region consists of a regional chief
administrative law judge and staff.
Hearing Offices: 140 on-site field offices consisting of judges, who conduct
hearings and decide cases, and support staff. Each
hearing office has a chief judge and office manager.
Other associated entities are (1) the disability determination services [DDS].
which are field offices within each state that adjudicate the claims initially and or
reconsideration, and (2) the Appeals Council, which is the Secretary's administrative
appellate body. The Appeals Council reviews cases on appeal from administrative law judgc
decisions and makes certain policy determinations.
B. Nature of the work.
The majority of OHA's work concerns claims for disability benefits under th
insured portion [Title II] of the Social Security Act or under the supplemental securit,
income [Title XVI] provisions of the Act [42 U.S.C.]. The ultimate issue in a disabilit,
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matter is whether the individual claimant suffers from a medically determinable impairment
that renders him or her incapable of substantial gainful activity for a period of at least 12
months. To answer this question, a five step sequential evaluation process has been
promulgated for application at all levels of administrative adjudication (20 CFR 404.1520 et
seq).
Such a claim may undergo as many as four levels of administrative review:
I. an initial determination by disability examiners at DDS. If the claim is
denied at this level and appealed, it undergoes...
2. a reconsideration determination by different disability examiners at the same
DDS office. If the claim is denied at this level and appealed, it undergoes
3. a formal hearing is held by an administrative law judge, who issues a
decision that may become the final decision of the Secretary. If the claim is
denied tattoos level and appealed, it undergoes...
4. review by the Appeals Council. A decision of the Appeals Council may be
challenged by a complaint in the federal district court.
Current data indicate that few claims that are denied by DDS at the initial review
are changed on reconsideration by DDS. In contrast, approximately 75% of those claims
appealed from the DDS reconsideration denial are reversed and granted by the
administrative law judge. Systemic problems explain this disturbing disparity, an issue
addressed below.
In FY 1992 OHA had a record year: it received approximately 391,000 requests
for hearing. These numbers continue to increase and the projections for FY 1993 extend to
nearly 500,000 requests for hearings which further stresses the capacity of this agency to
meet this work load. During this same period no additional administrative law judges were
hired and there were fewer support staff on duty. In October 1991 there were 860 ALJs on
duty; this number had decreased to 819 by February 1993 and only recently rose to 840.
During this same time period the field staff has declined from 4,256 to 4,094 persons.
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Given that OHA is the hearing level adjudication arm of SSA, its work is labor intensive
and any reduction in personnel has an immediate impact on its capacity to hear and decide
cases. The immediate result is delay for the claimants.
As we explain in further detail below, the judges have continually risen to the
challenge of confronting the tidal wave of hearing requests. However, the recent
unprecedented increase in hearing requests raises alarms. The agency knows how many
claims are filed, how many are denied by DDS, and what percentage is appealed
3
. As the
onslaught of work continued, OHA has consistently asked the agency for funds for more
judges, more staff, and more resources. Yet most of these requests have been denied. To
our knowledge, the agency did not allow OHA to testify when it (the agency) asked for a
$300 million budget supplement in the March 1993 hearing on the President's Stimulus and
Investment Proposals Affecting SSA, before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the
House Ways and Means Committee. Indeed, OHA now operates with skeletal resources.
Additionally, the pressure of the burgeoning caseload has resulted in such concern
in the bureaucracy that the highest priority is to dispose of cases quickly and get them out of
the way; whether the decisions are right or not is secondary. As a result, many judges feel
tremendously pressured simply to issue large numbers of decisions. Judges are trained to
issue decisions that are factually and legally sufficient. Production demands such as those
now being imposed by the agency make it impossible to issue a high quality product that is
fair, just, and sustainable in the federal courts. Not only is this state of affairs disheartening
to the judges; the public and the people claiming benefits deserve better.
31n 1992 SSA received 1.8 million applications and allowed only 42%. Of the 58% denied
(1.1 million), 48% (505,000) appealed. On reconsideration 17% (86,000) additional claims were granted
and 83% (420,000) were denied. Seventy percent (294,000) appealed to the ALJ level. Forty percent of
all claimants (721,000) dropped out before a hearing (595,000 before, and 126,000 after reconsideration).
1992 Green Book, H.R Committee on Ways and Means, Overview of Entitlement Programs (May 15,
1992), p. 61.
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Data from the Appeals Council fluctuate depending on which era one wishes to
study. In the past, the Appeals Council and the agency, particularly during the 1980's,
targeted decisions favorable to claimants for scrutiny. In later years, as the agency
struggled with the decisions in the federal courts and the conflict such decisions created
with agency policy, the Appeals Council targeted unfavorable decisions, often in an effort
to "educate" administrative law judges by remanding cases for re-adjudication in
accordance with policy, while ignoring the time-honored "substantial evidence" test. The
latter program increased the case backlog.
C. Adjudicative Standard[s].
The agency guidelines for disability adjudication at the initial and reconsideration
levels are set forth in the Program Operations Manual [POMS]. In contrast, administrative
law judges apply legal principles to disability claims, and thus are guided by statute,
regulation and case law. These standards are not consistent and frequently lead to different
results on the same fact situation.
More often than not, the inconsistency between the two standards is not
reconciled. For example, in the last decade, the federal courts have established important
rules concerning adjudication of pain; evaluation of treating physicians' opinions; and the
viability of substance abuse as a disability. These standards are not employed at the DDS
level. As a result, the DDS determinations often require reversal by the administrative law
judge. It is this difference in standards that accounts for much of the backlog at OHA and
the high rate of reversal of DDS decisions by administrative law judges.
D. The need for reform in the OHA administrative process.
SSA/OHA and its administrative law judges have a decades-long legacy of
conflict. This conflict was exacerbated in the early 1980's, when the then-new
administration instituted draconian efforts to reduce the disability rolls, often terminating
benefits without a hearing. SSA administrative law judges, applying constitutional and
legal principles to disability claims, responded by reinstating thousands of claims. This
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tension between the "program" side of the agency and the "due process" side of the agency
led to the infamous Bellmon review which led Congress and the federal courts to take
action protecting claimants.
4
That tension remains unresolved to this day. For example, with the alarming
increase in disability claims, the agency's current agenda is to process claims quickly. In
short, its primary goal is for judges to handle cases quickly, in volume, and in so doing to
adhere to the "program" or "policy" established by the agency. As one can see from the
American court system throughout the land, due process is, however, inherently time-
consuming and not as efficient as agency managers would wish. This is as true in
administrative agency adjudication as it is in any court system. Thus, the need for speed
and policy necessarily conflicts with the need to assure due process for each claimant.
The ALJs and support staff of OHA have a long and proud history of hard work
and service to the public. In 1975 the average number of dispositions per administrative
law judge per month was 16. The staffing ratio was 2.9 employees per judge. In FY 1992
the average per judge disposition was 36.6 with a staff ratio of 3.35 per judge. This
evidence shows that the judges have increased their dispositions by 128% while the staffing
ratio has increased by only 15.5%. It further shows that the judges have increased their
dispositions by 725% more than the increase in staff. This is a remarkable performance
especially in view of the fact that the cases have become far more complex, more
voluminous, require the use of more experts, have more lawyers appearing and are more
time consuming. This performance represents a tremendous public service and
contribution to the administration of justice. It demonstrates that the corps of
administrative law judges and support personnel of OHA are motivated by the highesi
4The inevitable result was that the courts created a body of caselaw that incorporates man3
more "subjective" [claimant-based] tests than were included in the original, more "objective" provisions o
the Act.
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professional standards. But the time has now come when more production cannot be
squeezed from the judges.
A historical review of OHA clearly establishes that the root cause of the conflict
between the agency and its administrative law judges results from the agency's inability to
accept the concept of independent administrative adjudication, as provided in the
Administrative Procedure Act. This conflict and controversy is well documented.
Congressional hearings in 1975, 1979, 1981, 1983 and 1988; numerous federal court
decisions; the recent study completed by the Government Accounting Office [GAO] and the
report of the Federal Court Study Committee have clearly established that the problems are
systemic. These congressional hearings, decisions and reports have demonstrated that
historically the agency has lacked an appreciation for the role of administrative law judges
as independent decision makers within the agency. The GAO report specifically found low
morale among the administrative law judges as well as the support staff. The background
materials for the Federal Court Study Committee stated: "Such tension is inevitable in a
system which houses supposedly independent adjudicators within a misoriented
department."
In 1983 the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs in the United States Senate conducted a hearing which
inquired into the role of the administrative law judge in the Title I Social Security
Disability Insurance Program (S. PRT. 98-111). The Committee issued its findings on
September 16, 1983. The principal finding of the Subcommittee was that the agency was
pressuring its ALJs to make decisions approved by the agency.
The Committee further found that the agency was increasing the rate at which
administrative law judges were expected to decide cases (the disposition rate), thereby
reducing the quality and quantity of time that an administrative law judge had to devote to
each case and further lessening the opportunity for the judge to develop additional evidence.
The conclusions of the Committee are set forth in part as follows:
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"The APA mandates that the AJ be an independent, impartial
adjudicator in the administrative process and in so doing separates the adjudicative
and prosecutorial functions of an agency. The AJ is the only impartial,
independent adjudicator available to the claimant in the administrative process, and
the only person who stands between the claimant and the whim of agency bias and
policy. If the AU_ is subordinated to the role of a mere employee, and instrument
and mouthpiece for the SSA, then we will have returned to the days when the
agency was both prosecutor and judge."
In the case of Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 620 F.
Supp. 1123 (1984), the Court found that the Social Security Administration had
implemented the Bellmon Review Program in a manner that pressured judges to issue fewer
allowance decisions. The Court stated as follows:
"The evidence, as a whole, persuasively demonstrates that the
defendants retained an unjustifiable preoccupation with allowance rates, to the
extent that the ALJs could reasonably feel pressure to issue fewer allowance
decisions in the name of accuracy. While there was no evidence that an AUJ
consciously succumbed to such pressure, in close cases, and, in particular, where
the determination of disability may have been largely on subjective factors, as a
matter of common sense, that pressure may have influenced some outcomes."
In sum, the Court concludes that defendants' unremitting focus on allowance rates
in the individual ALJ portion of the Bellmon Review Program created an untenable
atmosphere of tension and unfairness which violated the spirit of the APA, if no specific
provision thereof. Defendants' insensitivity to that degree of decisional independence the
APA affords to administrative law judges and the injudicious use of phrases such as
"targeting," "goals" and "behavior modification" could have tended to corrupt the ability of
administrative law judges to exercise that independence in the vital cases that they decide.
The recent report of the Federal Courts Study Committee addressed the problems
in the Social Security Administration Hearing System. The report stated as follows:
"Recent experience suggests that the process is vulnerable to unhealthy
political control. The Social Security Administration has made controversial efforts
to limit the number and amount of claims granted by the administrative law judges,
leading to widespread fears that the judges' proper independence has been
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compromised. (And the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration
lacks even the protection that the Administrative Procedure Act gives the
administrative law judge.)"
In a study titled Judges, Bureaucrats, and the Question of Independence, D. Cofer
demonstrated that management-minded bureaucrats and APA judges cannot live under the
same roof and that the current situation is a disservice to the American people.
It should be noted that even the Department of Health and Human Services has
questioned the wisdom of having the judges employed by the same agency whose cases they
decide. In a May, 1981 Management Oversight Review Report on the Office of Hearings
and Appeals and the Social Security Administration, the Office of Inspector General found
that the appeals process could be more effectively located outside the Social Security
Administration. The report highlighted the appearance of impropriety and the incongruity
in having one arm of the Social Security Administration making the basic eligibility
determinations in cases while the Office of Hearings and Appeals arm of the Social Security
Administration adjudicates that decision. It went on to question the wisdom of the
arrangement of putting the Office of Hearings and Appeals under the direction of an
Associate Commissioner because the Social Security Administration staff controls the
resources, space, equipment and supplies of the Office of Hearings and Appeals which, if
restricted, could indirectly control the number and quality of the hearings held.
The fundamental problem in the Office of Hearings and Appeals, as currently
constituted, is that the responsibility and accountability for the entire hearing and decisional
process is placed upon the individual administrative law judge, yet the judge has been given
no authority to carry out this mandate. Some years ago a "managerial" decision was made
to take away from the administrative law judge all supervisory authority over hearing office
support personnel, including staff attorneys, decision writers, clerical support staff and
typists. The result of this office configuration is that administrative law judges have no
power to expedite the work or assure that it is done correctly. Authority for case control,
resource improvement and management has been given to an ever enlarging group of non-
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legally trained bureaucrats who have no understanding of the concepts underlying the
Administrative Procedure Act or the concept of administrative due process. With respect to
the current parallel rather than cooperative system of management, we experience staff who
are not supervised by judges but by others, who assess their performance. Thus, many
times judges make requests only to find that they have been countermanded or ignored by
staff. Judges in some offices find that staff attorneys are ignoring their instructions in
drafting decisions, resulting in much lost time while the judge makes the appropriate
corrections. The judges have become demoralized, especially with the added pressure to
issue a large volume of cases, because of their frustration in trying to assure that their work
gets done appropriately. In many offices, this has resulted in numerous unhealthy
byproducts which undermine the ability of the judges to do the work they are hired to do:
confusion, improper priorities, delay, lack of communication. At the least, a work product
of lesser quality for this agency has resulted in more remands of decisions and a longer
processing time for claimants.
OHA also currently experiences much waste due to poor hiring practices, poor use
of professional and staff personnel, and inexplicable travel policies. For example, in
response to a GAO recommendation in 1989, the agency hired 200 new judges in 1990 and
1991. However, they were not placed in offices according to workload needs. Rather, some
new judges went to offices that were already adequately staffed, and therefore when they
arrived, they had insufficient work at that locale; while other offices did not get the judges
they needed. As a result, judges from the overstaffed offices were and continue to be sent
traveling nationwide, at considerable cost to the public, to address the backlog in those
areas that need help. Another example is that currently, because staff respond only
quixotically to judges' requests, many judges type their own correspondence and envelopes
and do their own xeroxing. This is a poor use of professional personnel, who receive a
much higher salary than clerical staff, and thus the cost of clerical work performed by a
judge is a waste of taxpayers' money.
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OHA has thus been plagued for over a decade with an inefficient management
system. This situation has resulted in a bloated bureaucratic structure consisting of
multiple, duplicative, administrative layers which respond to a centralized control process.
This organization has created a network of Regional Offices which micromanage the field
offices, which also have a local management team. The only function of the Regional
Offices is to act as a funnel for actions from Central Office, an unnecessary function
because modem communication systems permit Central Office to correspond directly with
the field offices. The existence of these management practices has been documented by the
1991 Process Review Report of OHA that was prepared by SSA. This report concluded, in
part, that OHA employees receive considerably less training and fewer career development
opportunities compared to other organizations within SSA; OHA is faced with a variety of
personnel and staffing-related problems; and the facilities, equipment and furniture for
OHA offices are not always conducive to high quality work. That the hearing process is
held in such low esteem is illustrated by the fact that OHA field offices are Just now getting
fax machines installed; and the fact that they are just now getting computers, the first of
which are assigned not to the judges or attorneys who issue decisions, but to the bureaucrats
who issue reports to headquarters.
With respect to micromanagement, SSA has of late been using the term "Total
Quality Management." Actual experience shows that while the agency and OHA employ
the term "Total Quality Management." they do not in practice understand or implement its
principles. The essence of Total Quality Management is horizontal involvement of the
work force, with consequent investment and empowerment of each employee. This
principle is completely at odds with the goals of control and micromanagement now present
within OHA. The result has been an expression in favor of Total Quality Management,
without any overt attempt to implement the system.
In addition, OHA has been impaired by inconsistent policies of other branches
within SSA which have impacted upon its ability to perform efficiently. As an example, the
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recently instituted Quality Assurance Program has created an elaborate 22 page checklist to
review ALJ decisions, which are frequently much less than 22 pages in length. Twenty-five
judges have been taken from their judicial duties to perform quality assurance review,
another inroad on our ability to adjudicate the backlog of claims pending. At the same time
the SSA Workgroup on OHA Workload Issues has suggested that, in view of the caseload
crunch, judges issue short-form decisions and "limit editorial changes to initial draft
decisions." The Office of Human Resources of SSA is simultaneously implementing a
program which replaces OHA attorney decision writers with non-attorney writers. Thus,
while appearing to demand a high quality legal product, the agency denies its judges the
resources to meet the demand. Inconsistent policies of this type, of other branches within
SSA, impact upon OHA in an adverse manner which is wasteful and inefficient. These
practices result in a poor quality work product, a waste of resources and delay for claimants.
The judges have fought a long and hard fight to assure the integrity and
impartiality of the administrative hearing process. During the 1980's, when SSA adopted a
program which attempted to systematically deny many Social Security claimants
administrative due process, the ALJs were the sole force in the agency which stood up
against this program and protected the rights of the people appearing before them. The
American Bar Association [ABA] subsequently issued a commendation to all ALJs in SSA
for this public service. The award stated as follows:
Be It Resolved, That the American Bar Association hereby commends
the Social Security Administrative Law Judge Corps for its outstanding efforts
during the period from 1982-1984 to protect the integrity of administrative
adjudication within their agency, to preserve the public's confidence in fairness of
governmental institutions, and to uphold the rule of law.
We submit that SSA continues to undennine the APA-protected due process
hearing rights of claimants. The SSA judges could not have performed their past heroic
public service without APA protection. The need to continue a strong and independeni
judiciary protected in fact -- not merely in theory -- by the APA is more important toda)
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than ever. The agency is, in our view, intent on establishing a disability program without
independent adjudicators. 5
The need for systemic reform in the SSA hearing process is apparent. Legislative
reform is necessary to provide the claimants with an administrative hearing system which
meets the constitutional requirements of a fair hearing.
E. Recommendations.
The Association of Administrative Law Judges recommends that the SSA
disability hearing process be reformed by adopting the following changes which in many
situations will result in monetary savings and reduce claimant delay.
1. Adopt the Reorganization of the Federal Administrative Judiciary Act. This Act will
reorganize the administrative judiciary into a unified corps of ALJs independent of
the agencies, and will promote independence, efficiency, productivity, the reduction
of administrative functions and provide economies of scale to better serve the public
in the resolution of disputes. This reorganization is required because the nature of
administrative hearings has changed. The hearings now resemble Article III court
actions with most respondents represented by skilled counsel. This is a change from
the classic agency licensing and rate-making model. This development requires a
new system that will provide due process for all parties, without agency interference,
without inconsistent policies, and without misuse of resources and personnel.
51n June 1993, an Update on Social Security Administration's Planning Process and
Implementation of the Strategic Priorities set forth the following timetable for establishing a hearing
process without APA due process protections:
FY 1993: Develop proposal for statutory and/or regulatory change to allow the use of case
adjudicators other than AL for Medicare Part B cases.
FY 1994: Revise policy and procedural material and establish senior staff attorney
position with magistrate authorities. Make recommendations on expension of the use of senior staff
attorney adjudicators in title II and XVI cases and Medicare A cases.
FY 1995: Develop proposal for statutory and/or regulatory changes to allow the use of case
adjudicators other than ALs for title II and XVI and Medicare Part A cases.
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Preliminary figures from the Congressional Budget Office suggest the Act will result
in tremendous cost savings.
2. Increase number of iudges and support staff. The increase in caseload can partially
be addressed by returning the SSA judges corps to its 1980's size of 900 judges
together with adequate support staff -- not supervisors but persons who work on
cases. This increase in personnel will provide OHA with the ability to reduce the
processing time for claimants by handling the cases in a timely manner.
3. Implement Social Security Benefits Reform Act of 1984. This Act directed the
Secretary to establish by regulation uniform standards to be applied at all levels of
determination, review and adjudication in determining whether individuals are under
disabilities. This mandate has not been implemented. Our best estimate is that if the
agency required the same standard at every level of adjudication, as required by the
1984 Act, the beneficial results would be enormous: (1) deserving claimants would
be paid earlier; (2) there would be a 30% to 40% lower appeal rate to the hearing
level; (3) there would consequently be no backlog as we see now; and (4) the reversal
rate at the administrative law judge level, rather than being at 70-75%, would decline
to approach that of a true appellate system.
4. Discontinue inconsistent policies within SSA. Inconsistent policies of other branches
within SSA must be discontinued. These policies have adversely impacted upon the
ability of the judges to function efficiently and have resulted in lesser work product
and delay for claimants.
5. Improve quality of appellate review of ALJ decisions. The quality of appellate
review of AM decisions at the Appeals Council level should be improved to provide
for a system of written opinions with precedential value. This change will create a
system of law that is national in scope instead of the present patchwork process. The
disability law will then have consistency which will provide predictability and reduce
1 QQA
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the number of cases that are now remanded after appeal. If the quality of appellate
review of the Appeals Council can not be improved, it should be abolished.
6. Reinstate continuing disability reviews. The agency labors under a crushing volume
of claims, without adequate staff to monitor the progress of any one claim. We are
particularly concerned that claimants continue to be paid for years, often due to the
fact that the agency lacks personnel to review the case, update the facts, and
determine whether the condition continues to be disabling. Judges often, in granting
claims, request review in a 12 to 24 month period, but these reviews are not actually
done. Despite the initial cost in personnel time, we believe the investment in
personnel will ultimately result in considerable cost savings to the people of the
United States. It should result in returning some claimants to a productive life. We
are concerned that given the finite resources of the disability trust fund, those funds
must be preserved for truly deserving future claimants, and not exhausted simply
because the agency cannot review the cases.
7. Substance abuse rehabilitation. Largely because of court decisions and developing
medical principles, the Secretary recognizes that substance addiction may be
disabling in and of itself. While the disability program mentions the need for
rehabilitation, many substance abusers end up receiving benefits but no treatment.
Not only is this distasteful to the public; more importantly, the government often
ends up funding at least a portion of the drinking or drugging of claimants. We
recommend funding of a meaningful drug and alcohol rehabilitation program, with
strong requirements for attendance, possible time limits for receipt of benefits, and
close supervision and review of the claimant's disability. It is also imperative to
monitor the representative payee program.
8. Reinstate vocational rehabilitation. We further recommend funding of a meaningful
vocational rehabilitation program. Many claimants over time assume what is
commonly known as a "disability conviction," a state of mind wherein one presumes
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he/she cannot be productive. Certainly the receipt of disability benefits without an
accompanying rehabilitation program reinforces that state of mind, and the
downward spiral it engenders. We are strongly convinced that investment in
vocational rehabilitation, followed by actual productive trial work, would ultimately
benefit not only the claimant but society in general.
9. Reconcile the statutes. We also recommend that the interplay between the
Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA] and the Social Security disability program be
reconciled. The ADA envisions that, at considerable cost for employers,
accommodations be made for the handicapped so that they can be put to work. Yet
the disability program finds many handicapped disabled who would otherwise be
employable with accommodation required by the ADA.
10. Start constructing the hearing file at the DDS level. At the present time a new file is
created at each level of the disability process. This inefficient method should be
replace by a system which adds exhibits to the disability case file at each succeeding
level. This initiative will save substantial worker hours and money at the OHA level.
11. and 12. Implement a face to face interview at initial determination level. The interview
should be informal and accessible to claimants. A uniform adjudication standard
should be used. The appeal to reconsideration at the DDS should be abolished
because of the ineffectiveness of the review at this level in the past. This change will
reduce the number of requests for hearings at the ALJ level.
Alternative dispute resolution. We recommend broadening the means of resolving
claims pre-hearing, and expanded use of the legal talents of our staff attorneys. The
goal should be to identify meritorious claims, grant them without a hearing [and thus
earlier], and free up judge time for more difficult cases. Other possible means of
pre-hearing resolution could include a summary judgment provision when the issues
are entirely legal and the facts not in dispute.
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13. Close record after AD hearing. The evidentiary hearing record should be closed
after the ALJ hearing is completed. An exception should be provided for
unrepresented claimants and for newly discovered evidence. This change will
encourage attorneys to be more diligent at the hearing and will avoid the numerous
remands for evidence first presented at the Appeals Council or district court level. It
will also develop a doctrine of administrative finality, reduce the hearing caseload,
reduce claimant delay and save money.
14. Streamline OHA decision writing process. In cases where the claim is approved, the
judge should have authority to issue minute orders, rule from the bench, and/or order
the claimant's attorney to prepare a proposed decision for the judge's consideration.
The psychiatric review technique form data and attorney fee order should be
incorporated into the ALJ decision rather than being appended as separate forms.
These changes will reduce the requirement from three forms to one for each written
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